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ABSTRACT
Although the role of the services sector in the economyhas grown
increasingly large, and partnerships are a prevalent formof organization in
this sector, relatively little is known about the behaviorand performance of
these firms. In this paper an attempt is made to fill that gap bydeveloping
and testing a model of the effect of alternative compensation arrangementson
productive efficiency in medical group practices. The techniqueemployed is
two—stage production frontier estimation. This technique providesdirect
estimates of productive efficiency and allows for differences across agentsin
ability or responsiveness to financial incentives. In thefrontier literature
productive efficiency is assumed to be exogenously given.In this paper it is
determined endogenously, thus a simple econometric technique correctingfor
this endogeneity in estimating the production frontier is employed.In
addition, the measures of efficiency themselves can be made dependent
variables for explicit econometric analysis of the determinantsof efficiency.
Overall, the empirical results are consistent with theoreticalwork on
internal theory of the firm,whichpredicts that productivity compensation
schemes will work well for firms with non-joint production andobservable
output. These two criteria are met by medical group practices.The treatment
of measured efficiency as an endogenous variable is unique and allows some
interesting insights into the determinants of productive efficiency.We find
that relating compensation to productivity does increase the quantityand
efficiency of production, as theory has hypothesized. The numberof members
in a group decreases both the quantity produced and the efficiencywith which
that output is produced. Experience does lead to greater productivityand
efficiency. Medical groups in general are measured as being no lessefficient
than an average manufacturing firm, but Health Maintenance Organizations are
less efficient than average.
Martin Gaynor Mark Pauly
Center for Health Economics Research University of Pennsylvania
72 2nd Avenue, Suite 100 Leonard Davis Institute




Although the role of the services sector in the economy has grown
increasingly large, and partnerships are a prevalent form of organization in
this sector, relatively little is knownaboutthe behavior and performance of
these firms. In this paper an attempt is made to fill that gap by developing
and testing a model of the effect of alternative compensation arrangements on
productive efficiency in medical group practices. In addition, some
comparisons of efficiency with manufacturing sectors are made.
There is a vast theoretical literature on compensation, organizational
form and efficiency in firms, but the empirical literature is comparatively
sparse. The basic theoretical results are that productivity based
compensation arrangements are best when production is non-joint across
agents. Jointness in production calls for some kind of sharing of revenues,
costs, or profits, plus monitoring where observability is possible. If
observability is impossible, bonus—penalty schemes work best.
Some empirical evidence on this matter has been provided by the
literature on the economics of medical group practices and legal group
practices. For medical practice )Jewhouse (1973) provided solid evidence of
"behavioral diseconomies of scale", or shirking under equal sharing
arrangements as size increases. Held, Pauly, and Reinhardt (1978), using a
more comprehensive data set, estimated a production function which examined
the effect of compensation arrangements. They found evidence that
productivity—based compensation arrangements do lead to greater productivity.
Similar evidence on legal practice is represented by Leibowitz and Tollison
(1980). Both of these studies do show "shirking" present under equal—sharing,
non—productivity based compensation arrangements.
The work in this paper differs from these prior studies in both focus
and technique. The intent of this research is to uncover the determinants of
productive efficiency in medical partnerships. The technique employed is
two—stage production frontier estimation. This technique allows for
differences across agents in ability or responsiveness to financial
incentives. In the frontier literature productive efficiency is assumed to be
exogenously given. In this paper efficiency is determined
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endogenously, and a simple econometric technique to take this endogeneity into
account in estimating the production frontier. In addition, the measures of
efficiency themselves can be made dependent variables for explicit econometric
analysis of the determinants of efficiency. The paper is organized as
follows: Section 2.0 contains the theoretical model, in 3.0 the econometric
methodology is presented, there is a discussion of the data in section 4.0,
5.0 contains estimation results, and 6.0 has the summary and conclusions.
2.0THE MODEL
In this model the partners are utility maximizing agents who make
decisions over "effort" in response to the incentives present in the firm's
compensation method) The compensation structure is treated as fixed by any
partner, although it is endogenous as far as the group as a whole is
concerned. Effort is defined as a variable input supplied by a partner which
determines his efficiency of production. In order to highlight the efficiency
aspects of production, all other inputs are assumed to be chosen at the firm
2
level.
Production is described by the production function:
q =f(h,t, k, e,O), (1)
1 1 1 11 1
where q. =quantityproduced by partner,3
h. =partneri's hours at work in the given period,
This model draws on that contained in Gaynor (1986).
2Some empirical support for this assumption is provided by the fact that in
the data sample employed in this study, less than 35% of physicians indicated
that they set their own hours.
3
Output is assumed homogeneous. Although output may truly be heterogeneous,
and compensation structure will affect the quality of service (asshownin
Gaynor; 1986), the incentives for efficiency in production are unchanged by
heterogeneity of the product.
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h. =H—1.,where II. represents the maximum
1 1 1 1
numberof hours available to I in the period and 1.
represents i's leisure time,
t. =non—partnerlabor hours used by i,
k. =capitalservice hours used by I,
e =i'seffort,
and O a vector of i's characteristics which affect 1
productiveefficiency.
f is assumed to be strictly concave in all inputs. Effort increases the
marginal productivity of all factors of production, but the elements of .
onlyaffect the marginal productivity of h.
Given h., t., k. chosen by the firm and 0. is exogenous, the partner's
choiceof effort determines the quantity produced. This choice maximizes his
or her utility, and utility in turn depends directly on the net income the
physicianreceives and inversely on the level of effort and hours applied.
The utility function is assumed to be linear in money and additively separable
in effort,




and v. = theprivatenon—monetary cost of effort and hours. v. is
assumed to be strictly convex in e and h,.
1 1




where e =theproportion of net income generated by i that he "keeps."
e€[O,lJ
P =theoutput price set by the firm,
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C=theaverage cost of non—physician inputs, assumedconstantover
output,
and n =thenumber of partners inthe firm.
Thus,thefirst term in (3) is the portion of net income generated by i which
he"keeps," and the second term is his share fromthe firm's net—income
sharingpool.4




n ae ae i i
Thesecond order condition (not shown) also holds, given the assumptions made
about the functions u., v., andf.Equation (4) canbereadily interpreted as
indicating that the utility maximizing level of effort is where the marginal
net income product of effort (the first term in (4)) is equal to its marginal
utility cost (the second term in (4)). Figure 1 illustrates this. In A.,
utility is maximized at the tangency (point E) between an indifference curve,
uu, and the effort—income locus, YY. In B., this is represented by the point
(E) where the marginal net income product of effort curve and marginal utility
cost of effort curve cross.
Examining the comparative static derivatives for the equilibrium shows
the effects of changes in a, P. n or C on the optimal choice of e,. Table 1
contains the results. These. canalsobe determined by examination of the
effects of anyof these variables on curve YTin Figurel.A or curves II and
CCin Figure 1.B.
It is clear from these results that a partner will be responsive to
changes in the compensation structure and other variables set by the firm.
Theeffect of an increase in a is to increase productivity, or measured
efficiency, given measured levels of all inputs, because the increase will
call forth higher levels of the unmeasured input effort, e.,.
4This form is highly simplified; real world compensation structures often have
different shares for revenue and cost, and non—physician average cost is not
necessarily constant.
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Given the impossibility of measuring effort, an estimate of the
production function will require attention both to the shape of the frontier
and the impact of the compensation structure on the distance between actual
output and the frontier.
Usingthe frontier technique for estimating the production function will
provide direct evidence of the effect of compensation structure on the
measured efficiency of production. Using the frontier technique controls for
the possibility that partners have differences in efficiency, ability, and
degree of responsiveness to financial incentives. These are unmeasured
attributes contained in the 0. vector.
1
Inthis paper we will analyze measured productivity by using both
endogenous right side variables and a frontier function technique. Correct
treatment of the error term in a regression equation requires that these
approaches be combined.
To see why this is so, note that a conventional OLS regression line can
suffer from two kinds of problems: there may be simultaneous equations bias,
and the line through the central tendency of the data may not describe the
experience of the most efficient producers. Simultaneous equations bias will
arise if agents differ in their responsiveness to incentives and they can
choose their level of incentives. Frontier functions are appropriate if
agents differ in their ability to produce, given the incentives they face.
Since agents in the real would probably differ in both willingness and
ability, we need to take account of both influences.
Suppose initially that all agents have equal ability, in the sense that,
with a given level of effort and with given levels of all other inputs, equal
outputs will be observed. However, since the level of effort is not directly
observable, measured productivity can still differ. Suppose also that agents
differ in their responsiveness to financial incentives, that is, in their
willingness to trade off effort for financial reward. When faced with
payments that fully correspond to the revenue for their services ( =1),all
agents are equally productive; as a falls below unity, productivity falls,
but at different rates for different agents. Figure 2 shows several possible
"incentive-productivity" curves; the dashed line plots the curve for an
individual of average responsiveness.
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Since reducing a below unity reduces productivity, why wouldany firm
choose a value less than one? One may conjecture that, for risk averse
individuals facing a situation in which actual productivity is affectedby
random events, some implicit insurance may be chosen. Having sicker patients
come to one's office may reduce productivity, but receiving part of one's
office may reduce productivity, but receiving part of one's compensationas a
salary guards against this risk.
If individuals have similar attitudes toward risk, one would thenexpect
the level of a chosen to be inversely related to the degree of responsiveness
to financial incentives. Actual observations might cluster as the "x's" in
Figure 2, and the estimated a would be indicated by the slope of the line
SE', which does not even have the same sign as any of the true values of a.
The solution to this problem is to find identifying variables, and treat
a as endogenous. Our data set does contain a number of such variables.
The other influence on productivity is the ability of the individual
agent. Figure 3 illustrates this point in a situation in which all partners
are of equal responsiveness to incentives, but of two levels of ability. (In
order to observe variation in a, we will need to assume that some other
determinant of the desired level of a, e.g., risk aversion, variesacross
individuals.) The able partners always produce more output at all levels of
a (A, A1). The unable partners produce less (U.U1). Standard regression
techniques will result in the estimated function represented by the dotted
line SS. Frontier estimation will compare actual output with the best
practice frontier, FF. Clearly frontier estimation deals more effectively
with the problem of unobserved abilities than does standard regression
analysis.
This approach has a further implication for the relationship between
deviations of observed, from best practice, output and the level ofa. Note
that, in Figure 1, the incentive productivity curves are closer together at
high a than at lower levels of a. If there are some reasons why a might
vary at a given level of incentive responsiveness (e.g., variation in degree
of risk aversion), then one might observe people with different levels of
responsiveness as indicated by the x's and the z's in Figure 4. But note that
the deviation between the best practice frontier and the actual values ismuch
smaller for the x's (high a) than it is for the z's (low a).
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The literatureon production frontiers and comparative efficiency (see
Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977), Forsund et al., (1980) and Greene (1980)),
indicates that technical, or productive efficiency can be estimated via
econometric techniques as a means of comparing actual output to that which
would result from a "best practice" frontier which corresponds to the most
efficient set of observations. This implies:
q =f(h,t, k)u (5)
1 1 11 1






Since in the conventional treatment the production function f represents
the frontier along which decisions are efficient, the error term must be
constrained to be nonnegative. Much of the literature on frontier estimation
examines maximum likelihood estimation of functions like (5), perhaps with the
addition of a two—sided error term to represent truly randomdeviations.5
Greene (1980), Richmond (1970). and Forsund et al., (1980), have shown that a
"corrected ordinary least squares" technique, or "COLS" can be used to
estimate consistent and unbiased estimates of the frontier. This technique
involves estimating the production function by OLS and then changing the
constant term until all the regression residuals are non—negative.
The production function to be estimated is of form
5Estimation of productive efficiency without the two—sided error term
introduces a downward bias, if any, into efficiency estimates. This is
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which is the same form as in Held and Reinhardt (1978), excepting the
multiplicative error team.
As in Richmond (1974), it is assumed that the multiplicative error term,
U.= exp(—z.),where the z's are drawn from a Gamma distribution. Then
taking the natural logarithm of equation (6):
logQ =a+(3 logX +}yY —z (7)










logQ =13+Z(3logX +y I +v (8)
io iiii kkki I
where E(v.) =0
E(v2)
and E(v,. v )=0 1h
1
Thefurther assumption is made that E(V IK)=0,(where V and K are
vectors). Then, denoting the least squares estimator of ) by X and the





— — Ef3log X—Ey Y ) (9)
i o jjjikk ki
N —K—11=1.
Where N is the total number of observations and IC the totalnumber of
independent variables. A is the estimated varianceof the regression
residuals, or the meansquarederror of the regressions. 3 +Ais an
unbiased estimator of a, and exp (f +A)is an upward biased but consistent
estimator of A.
Now the size of "measured" efficiency in production is given by u, as
indicated earlier. Call the average measured efficiency.
-k
c=E(u) =2 (10)
where u =exp(—z)and z has the density function G(z;X). The estimated
measured efficiency thus is c =2,and this in turn is a consistent, but
upward biased estimator of c. Greene (1980) points out thatthe bias can
be removed from the intercept, and thus the efficiency, estimators by simply
changing the value of the intercept until no residuals are positive.This
procedure is employed in this study.
In addition to the c measure of productive efficiency derived from
Greene (1980) and Richmond (1974), we employ an efficiency measure suggested
by Cavin and Stafford (1985). This is a measure of relative efficiency,
indicating the mean difference within each firm beteen actual performanceand
the best practice point, standardized by the range of the regression
residuals, so that the efficiency measure is within the rangeto,i.i6.







6Notice that although in the case of a two error term frontier some
manipulation is required to obtain a firm-specific efficiency measure (see
Jondrow, Lowell, Materov, and Schmidt (1982)), no such calculation is
necessary here, due to the single error term structure.
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for the firm, where e. is the corrected OLS (COLS) error for firmi,e is
.1 max
the maximum of all COLS errors, ande is the minimum of all COLS errors.
mm
The average relative efficiency for the sample is
N e -e
r=1 E max i (12) Ni=le —e
max mm
As noted earlier, the compensation structure of the firm will affect
both the shape of the production frontier and the estimated distance between
actual output and the frontier. That is, what is relevant is the difference
between the best practice output and the actual output, conditional on the
level of incentives for efficiency. Thus, OLS estimates of the production
function will be both biased and inconsistent. This problem can be remedied
by using two—stage least squares estimation techniques. The correct residual
to use as a base for measures of efficiency is calculated using the
second—stage parameter estimates and the actual variable values for endogenous
right side variables, not those calculated using instruments,
v =logQ ——ElogX -Zy Y (13)
i 1ojjii kkki
where the f3's and y's are estimates from the second—stage equation. This
residual can then be used to calculate Greene's measure of efficiency, c, or
Cavin and Stafford's measure, r. These are consistent and unbiased.
4.0 DATA
The data utilized for this study were assembled by Mathematica Policy
Research, Inc., under contract to the National Center for Health Services
Research, Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Government. The bulk
of the data set is composed of surveys conducted by Matheniatica, although some
secondary data sources have been merged in. During the period March to June
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of 1978, fathematica conducted a nationwide survey of medical group
practices. The final sample included 957 groups and 6353 physicians
practicing in those groups. The sample was stratified by: group size, type
of group (multispecialty or single specialty), physician specialty, and
prepaid vs. fee—for—service. Largegrouppractices were oversampled in an
ef fort to supply a reasonable number of observations, and a census was taken
of pre-paid groups, for the same purpose. Further, only five medical practice
specialities were sampled: general practice, internal medicine, pediatrics,
enera1 surgery, and obsterics/gynecology. Approximately 60 percentof all
office-based physicians practice in these specialities.
Since surveys tend to produce low response rates, Mathematica conducted
analysisfor nonresponse bias on their data. Examining each of the survey
instruments and using statistical techniques (e.g., the Heckman Technique)
Mathematica concluded that nonresponsebias was not a problem to be faced in
theutilization ofthe data set for purposes of statistical analysis.
Thisdata set also includes data measuring characterisitcs ofthe area
inwhich the group practiced and dataon the hospital with which the group is
affliated. The data onarea characteristics were obtainedfrom many sources,
including the American Medical Association, The County and City Data Book, and
various other sources. For a full listing of all these data sources see
Boldin, Carcagno, Held, Jamieson, and Woolridge (1979). The hospital data
were obtained from the American Hospital Association Guide for 1978.
This data set is currently the most complete and comprehensive of its
kind in the U.S., and as such is appropriate for the empirical analysis
conducted in this paper.
5.0ESTIMATIOU RESULTS
A number of different empirical procedures are employed to examine the
determinants of productive efficiency. The production frontier is estimated
using the two—stage procedure described previously. This provides estimates
of the parameters of the production function and allows the efficiency
measures, candr, to be calculated. Two methods are used to uncover the
determinants of efficiency. One, the sample is split between productivity
—16—Ill 9P/Ol 1 a
related and unrelated compensation structures and production frontiers
estimated on each subsample. Theory predicts that the estimated efficency of
production should be higher for the productivity related compensation
structure subsample. Two, the measure of productive efficiency can be made a
dependent variable and regressed against its hypothesized determinants. As
indicated before, this is possible due to the fact that a single error term
frontier model is employed in this study. Finally, a test for efficient
employment of labor is presented. Table 2 presents the acronyms and
definitions for the variables employed in estimating the production frontier.
Table 3 has the means and standard errors of those variables.
Three of the independent variables, INCOPROD, LNGRPSIZ, and HMO, are
likely endogenous. The physician will have an effect on which values of these
variables he is associated with in two ways: his part in decision—making
within the group, and his choice of which group to join. The physician
preference variables, e.g., I1'fPRODY. PREFSIZ, are hypothesized to affect the
values of INCOPROD, LMGRPSIZ, and lIMO. Thus, the system is estimated via
two—stage least squares.
The first—stage estimates are presented in Table 5. Table 4 shows the
second stage estimates of the production function. The signs on the
second—stage coefficients are generally as expected. One exception is LMEXRM,
which is insignificant;. It may be that the number of examining rooms per
M.D. functions as a poor proxy for the flow of capital services. The other
inputs, physician time, (LNOHRSF), aide time (HRSNON), and administrators'
time (HRSADIf) all have positive and significant coefficients. Experience has
a positive but diminishing effect, consistent with greater experience leading
to greater productivity, but being counteracted by increasing age. The
coefficient for group size is negative and significant. This is consistent
with increasing group size leading to diminution of efficiency incentives, as
hypothesized.
The compensation structure variable, IIICOPROD, is positive and signif i—
cant, as hypothesized. An increasingly strong link between compensation and
productivity does lead to more office visits per week being produced. This is
the finding of Held, Pauly, and Reinhardt (1978). This is as hypothesized for
a firm with non—joint production, where output can be observed. Whether or
not the group is multispecialty or an lIMO seems to have little effect on out—





LNOVISSF Natural log ofthe number of first—timeoffice visits per week
INCOPEOD A scale varying between I and10,increasing with strength of
relation between compensation and productivity
LNGRPSIZ Naturallog of the number of FTE Physicians in the group
practice
HJIO Dummyvariable indicating ifthe group is 50 percent or more
prepaid
LNOHRSF Natural log of the number of physician hoursper week
LEXRM Natural log of the number of examining rooms per FTE M.D.
HRS&ON Hours of non—physician medical personnel
HRSADM }lours of administrative personnel
HRSTOTSQ Total hours of non—physician personnel, squared
EXPKR Numberof years since graduating from medical school
F.XPERSQ F.XPERsquared
GPS, PDS, OBSPhysician specialty dummies for general practice, pediatrics,
and obstetrics/gynecology, respectively —Internalmedicine is
excluded.
OWNRESP Whether the physician judges himself responsive to financial
incentives
MULTSPEC Dummy for whether the group is multi— or single—specialty
GPA Dummy for whether there is more than one graduate physician
assistant
IIIPREGY Lack of importance of regular income to physician
SIZRkGY Group size best providing regular income





IMPROTF.C Lack of importance of protection from financial risk in
practice
SIZPROTEC Group size best providing financial protection
TYPROTEC Group type best providing financial protection
IMPRODY Lackof importance of productivity related to income
SIZPRODY Group size best relating productivity to income
TYPRODY Group typebestrelating productivity to income
IHPCOSTY Lack of importanceofcosts related to income
SIZCOSTY Group size best relating costs to income
TYPCOSTY Group type best relating costs to income
IMPREGHE Lack of importance of regular hours
TYPREGHR Group type best providing regular hours
SIZREGHR Group size best providing regular hours
PREFSIZ Preferred group size

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The first—stage estimations contain some interesting resultsThe
physician preference variables tended to have the signs intuition would
suggest. Physicians with a preference for hard work or productivity—related
rewards should locate in groups with high INCOPROD, or lead groups to adopt a
high INCOPEOD. That is what the empirical results indicate. IMPREGY, the
lack of alleged importance of regular income, was positively related to
INCOPROD, indicating that the less important is regular income to a physician,
the more strongly related to productivity will his group's compensation
structure be. When the dependent variable is lIMO, the sign of IMPREGY is the
opposite, indicating that as importance of regular income declines, it is less
likely a doctor will be in an lIMO.IMPRODY, the lack of alleged importance of
productivity related to income, is negatively related to IJICOPROD. (Here
"importance" is interpreted as the physician's subjective feelings aboutthe
propriety of relating income to productivity.) This indicates that the less
important is productivity related to income, the weaker will be therelation
between income and productivity. As preferred group size rises (PREFSIZ), so
does group size and the probability of being in an HIfO. The variable OWNRESP,
which increases with the physician's responsiveness to financial incentives,
had no statistically significant effect on any of the dependent variables.
Board certification status, thought to be a proxy for physician ability, was
also uniformly insignificant.
We examine efficiency, given the compensation method, by stratifying the
sample by values of INCOPROD and comparing the efficiency estimates across
subsamples. The variable INCOPROD contains the response to a survey question
asking how closely income is related to productivity in the group. It is
specified to take a value of one when there is no relationship, and tenwhen
the relationship is perfect. Due to the nature of the question responses with
values in the range two to nine are difficult to interpret. We therefore
split the sample by high (6-10) and low (1—5) values ofINCOPROD.7 The
estimates of the two measures of efficiency, c and r, are contained in Table
6. The values of both c end r are significantly higher for the high INCOPROD
subsample than for the low INCOPROD subsample. In both cases the difference
in efficiency measures across subsamples is approximately equal to .05.
7A Chow test shows a significant difference at the 5% level between estimates






HighINCOPROD 0.948 0.914 757
LowINCOPROD 0.899 0.855 454
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Table 7 reports the values of c and r for the sample stratified into 3
groups, [1,31. [4,71, [8, 10). Both efficiency measuresrise with IPICOPEOD.
Overall, efficiency does appear to rise with I)JCOPROD, supporting the
hypothesis of this paper. Plot only does a productivity based compensation
structure lead to a greater level of production, it leads to more efficient
production.
It is interesting to compare these estimates of efficiency againstthose
obtained for manufacturing. Richmond (1974) obtained a mean efficiency
measure (c) for manufacturing of 0.869. Given that theservices sector, and
particularly medical practice, is often alleged to be grosslyinefficient
relative to the manufacturing sector, it is interesting that the efficiency
estimates obtained here compare favorably with one obtained for
manufacturing. This gives reason to doubt whether production of physician
services is any less efficient than production in the industrial sectorof the
economy.
In order to examine the effect of compensation method on productive
efficiency in a more systematic way, we regressed one of the efficiency
measures, c, on some hypothesized determinants. These arethe exogenous
characteristics of the medical groups, such as compensation structure or group
size. Table 9 presents the results. ALPHA is a dummy variable takingvalue
one when INCOPEOD is greater than 5, and zero otherwise.ALPHA2 is one when
IPlCOPROD equals ten and zero when IPICOPROD equals one. The results support
the hypotheses that productive efficiency increases as compensationis related
to productivity, since both ALPHA and ALPHA2 turn up positive and significant
in all the specifications. The coefficient for CRPSIZ is negative and
significant, supporting the hypostheses that diminished productivity
incentives as group size rises leads to a loss of efficiency. Physician
experience, EXPER, is seen to increase measured efficiency. Efficiencyis
lower in 1*50's, as has been alleged in some quarters. This may bedue to lack
of productivity incentives in the compensation structure, larger groupsizes
associated with Hi?40's, or the removal of physicians from the decision—making
process in HifO's. Interestingly enough, thecoefficient for multispecialty
groups is positive and significant. Multispecialty groups maysave their
member physicians the costs associated with lumpy demand, including slacktime
—26—TABLE 7




























































































and time spent drumming up patients, mainly via referrals. The system of
internal referrals in multispecialty groups may decrease physician slack time
and the "one—stop shopping" nature of a multispecialty group may make it more
attractive to consumers, thus relieving group members of the necessity of
finding patients.
Speaking to the issue of the efficient use of inputs, we examinethe use
of non-physician medical personnel (HRSIJON) by calculating the value of the
marginal product and comparing it to the wage. Table 10 presentsthese
results. They point to underuse of aide—time for most specialties. These
results are consistent with the results from previous studies, expeciallythat
of Reinhardt (1975).
6.0SUMMARY AND CO}JCLUSIONS
The goal of this paper was to investigate the determinants of productive
efficiency in partnerships. This has been done for the case ofmedical group
practice by using the frontier estimation technique and itsassociated
efficiency measures. We find that relating compensation to productivitydoes
increase the quantity and efficiency of production, as theory has
hypothesized. The number of members in a group decreases boththe quantity
produced and the efficiency with which that output is produced.Experience
does lead to greater productivity and efficiency. Medical groupsin general
are measured as being no less efficient than an averagemanufacturing firm,
but Health Maintenance Organizations are less efficient than average.
Non—physician labor is underemployed, although this result couldbe an
artifact of unmeasured quality or defensive medicine.
Overall, the empirical results are consistent with theoreticalwork on
internal theory of the firm, which predicts that productivity compensation
schemes will work well for firms with non—joint production and observable
output. These two criteria are met by medical group practices.The treatment
of measured efficiency as an endogenous variable is unique and allows some
interesting insights into the determinants of productive efficiency.Future
research examining efficiency and its determinants for other services (e.g.,



































*Thjs equals exp(mean of LNOVISSF)
**This equals the fee x marginal product: of HRSNON, wheremarginal product
equals the regression coefficient on HRSNON1 multiplied by themean number
of office visits,
a
1 1.e.,Q=Aflxexp(zbz)+pp=Q=bxQ. jjj z azjj
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